John

Mental Health and Oral Health

In the 2019-2020 academic year, I had the opportunity to train in behavioral health at an academic dental school. It was a fascinating experience. But I often had difficulty explaining to people what, exactly, I was doing in a dental school. This post is an attempt to answer that question, drawing on some of the varied literature on this topic.

Problems in mental health tend to give rise to problems in oral health. The most well-known of these effects, perhaps, is dental anxiety, a well-documented phenomenon (indeed there are several scales that may be used to measure it). Anxiety in turn leads to the postponement of dental care, which in turn leads to poor oral health. There are also more indirect, but equally pernicious, connections between mental health and oral health.

Substance use disorders are perhaps the clearest case. The effects of methamphetamine use on oral health are well known (in fact it is not the drug itself but the associated “lifestyle” of high sugar consumption and poor self-care that leads to the dental health effects), but substance use disorders generally give rise to oral health problems.

Severe mental illnesses such as schizophrenia have similarly devastating effects. A “DMFT score” measures how many Decayed, Missing, or Filled Teeth a person has. A typical person with severe mental illness has a DMFT score of more than 20 – that is, 20 Decayed Missing or Filled Teeth. Again, the mechanism of action here is indirect: severe mental illness is associated with avoidance of dental care (either directly through dental anxiety or indirectly through poverty and associated outcomes) and poor self-care.

One lesson of these sobering statistics is that mental health care and oral health care should be “integrative,” in the sense that the one should be provided alongside the other. This is done more and more often in (medical) primary care, but it remains non-standard in dental care. In one way, this is precisely the opposite of how things should be. Since dental care can be so urgent, it often brings individuals into the health care system who would otherwise avoid it. Thus, dentistry is a first “point of contact” for individuals who are otherwise adrift from health care generally and mental health care specifically.

There have been a few efforts in this direction that bear mentioning:

“Dental as Anything.” A collaborative program between mental health and oral health services in Melbourne, Australia, focusing on assertive outreach to hard-to-reach populations in Melbourne.

Project FLOSS. In my view, this project at the University of Utah is one of the most innovative interventions for substance use disorders. Providing full-spectrum oral health care to individuals in early recovery is shown to dramatically increase length of abstinence and other positive outcomes.

Treatment of patients with schizophrenia. I am not aware of any specific program that works on this, but there is clearly a need for one. Policies of “deinstitutionalization” have led individuals with schizophrenia to be treated at community health centers rather than in institutions. This presents a challenge for oral health care, as individuals with schizophrenia often have difficulty with oral health treatment, and community dental health centers are often challenged to make adequate accommodations.

As noted above, the literature on this topic is varied, and scattered across the journals of various disciplines. Some of the articles I have found helpful are cited above. I have especially benefited from the work of Steve Kisely, a psychiatrist in Australia who works on (among other things) the connections between psychiatric conditions and physical disorders. See his “No Mental Health without Oral Health”  and this 2015 meta-analysis of connections between oral health and mental health, on which he is lead author: “A Systematic Review and Meta-Analysis of the Association Between Poor Oral Health and Severe Mental Illness.”

‘Can’ and Reference

I would like to make an observation about the semantics of ‘can’ (and, I believe, of agentive modals generally) that has not been noted, to my knowledge, in the previous literature. This observation appears to tell against a theory of ‘can’ of the kind proposed by Kratzer in her great essays on this topic.

Quine says that a context is ‘referentially opaque’ just in case the substitution of co-referring names may induce a change in truth value. Thus:

(1) Lois is unaware that Clark was born on Krypton

(2) Lois is unaware that Superman was born on Krypton

We can imagine that (1) is true and (2) false (perhaps this was true in the comic books). So ‘is unaware that’ is referentially opaque.

By contrast, a context is ‘referentially transparent’ just in case the substitution of co-referring names does not induce a change in truth value.

It will be helpful to define up an additional notion. Let us say that a context is strongly referentially transparent just in case the substitution of co-referring names OR definite descriptions does not induce a change in truth value. (Maybe this notion already has a name in the previous literature, and I think some people may already be using transparency in this broader sense, or even more broadly to range over demonstratives etc. Anyhow, this is how I will be using the term).

I now wish to make two claims: (i) ‘can’ is strongly referentially transparent and (ii) this is difficult to accommodate within the standard Kratzer framework for ‘can’.

Here is the argument for (i). Let us say that Smith is in fact the most popular man in town. Consider:

(3) Jones can have dinner with Smith

(4) Jones can have dinner with the most popular man in town

Given that Smith is in fact the most popular man in town, the truth of (3) ensures the truth of (4), and conversely. There is no way for the one to be true and the other false.

Crucially, this is the case even under unusual circumstances. Let us say that Smith would in fact have dinner with Jones only if his popularity declined – since he is so popular, he is very busy, but were he less popular, his calendar would free up. So – now speaking a bit more semantically – the scenario in which Jones in fact has dinner with Smith is one in which Smith is _not_ the most popular man in town. Nonetheless, that scenario suffices for the truth of (4), since we describe the scenario in terms of how things actually are – and, actually, Smith is the most popular man in town. So we might sensibly say: “Jones can have dinner with the most popular man in town, Smith, though, if they really did have dinner, Smith would not be so popular.”

Here is the argument for (ii), that it is difficult to accommodate this observation within the Kratzer semantics. On the Kratzer semantics, (3) is true only if there is a world w meeting certain conditions (roughly, that it is in the set of worlds W that are compatible with the modal base and that are most highly-ranked according to the ordering source) such that Jones has dinner with Smith at that world. Let us say that there is some such world – call it w1 – and so that (3) is true.

Now, by our argument above, (4) must be true as well. Is it? Well, (4) is true only if there is a world w meeting certain conditions (roughly, that it is in the set of worlds W that are compatible with the modal base and that are most highly-ranked according to the ordering source) such that Jones has dinner with the most popular man in town at that world. Is there? Well, there may or may not be. Since all that is ensured by the truth of (3) is the existence and accessibility of w1, the truth of (4) is ensured only if w1 is a world such that Jones has dinner with the most popular man in town at that world. And this may not be the case, as in the scenario described above.

So it is difficult to explain the strong referential transparency of ‘can’ on the Kratzer account. I do not say that it is impossible to do so, and I’m open to the idea that some mechanism could give an explanation of this phenomenon. That said, I think this little argument suggests two broader points.

First, there’s an extensive philosophical literature on reference and modality, including the Quine essay mentioned above and a few lectures. To some extent these issues have been taken up in the excellent recent literature on epistemic modals. To my knowledge, they are less studied in the literature on ‘root modals,’ which include agentive modals but also include circumstantial modals more generally as well as deontic modals. I’d be interested in seeing more discussion of how issues of reference and modality play out in thinking about root modals.

Second, I’m sympathetic with the thought that agentive modals don’t quantify over worlds but instead quantify over intra-worldly entities – what I call options. Options are not themselves modal, though they do have modal entailments. On my view, (3) is true because Jones has, at this world, a certain option. That very option is, at this world, an option of meeting the most popular man in town. So (4) is true as well. So this is a phenomenon that can be explained quite simply when we take options as fundamental.

The Boston School for Social Workers

I’m currently studying at the Simmons University School of Social Work, which is a direct descendant of the Boston School for Social Workers (sometimes referred to as the “Boston School of Social Work”). This school was an influential and historically significant institution, yet there is pretty minimal documentation of it available online. There’s not even a Wikipedia page. So I thought it might be useful to provide a brief history of the Boston School for Social Workers in this post.

The Boston School for Social Workers was an innovative 12-year collaboration between Simmons and Harvard. It was founded in 1904, and Jeffrey Richardson Bracket – a major figure in philanthropic work, then based at Johns Hopkins – was appointed as its director. The school was located at 9 Hamilton Place, not far from the Park Street T station. Harvard left the arrangement in 1916, at which part the school became the Simmons School of Social Work

The Boston School for Social Workers was, arguably, the very first school of social work in the United States. A useful article by Linda M. Shoemaker indicates that it had two rivals for this claim: the New York School of Philanthropy (also founded in 1904) and the Chicago School of Civics and Philanthropy (founded a year earlier, in 1903). The Boston School for Social Workers, however, is distinctive for its use of the term “social work” in its very title, as well as its university affiliation. In this sense it is the progenitor of what we would now recognize as schools of social work.

It is instructive to consider why the partnership with Harvard ended. Richardson suggests that there was a division between more theoretical and more practical elements of social work, and that this division took on a gendered aspect. The more theoretical side was taken to be the province of men and, hence, of Harvard (then an entirely male university). The more practical side was taken to be the province of women and, hence, of Simmons (then an entirely female college, as it remains at the undergraduate level). As this division grew, and as the school grew more practical in its orientation, Harvard withdrew from the agreement, and diverted its energies towards Harvard’s Department of Social Ethics, an object of historical interest in its own right.

 

 

The Squiggle Game

Here is a short piece I recently wrote for the Boston Art Review, on Winnicott and squiggles:

The Squiggle Game

The psychoanalysis of children is an exercise in uncertainty, as there is no mind is as uncertain as a child’s. It is also, when practiced with some measure of self-awareness, an exercise in light comedy. To read the annals of child psychoanalysis is to experience the joy of witnessing some very serious people being slightly silly. Here is Erik Erikson – refugee from 1930’s Vienna, professor of psychology at Harvard, who gave himself the name “Erikson” to indicate he was the son of no one but himself – making a zoo out of building blocks for imagined lions. And here is D.M. Winnicott, perhaps the most profound analyst of the last century, playing the Squiggle Game.

In the Squiggle Game, the analyst blindly draws a “squiggle” on the page, and then the child completes the drawing into something that the child recognizes. Winnicott draws a “squiggle of the closed variety,” and Iiro, a Finnish boy in an orthopedic hospital, decides that it is a duck’s foot, and draws the leg and the webbing. (“It was clear immediately that he wished to communicate on the subject of his disability”). Then the child draws a squiggle, and the analyst completes it. And back and forth like that. A car, a bow-tie, a teapot, a goose, a mountain, the sea. Children rarely want to take the drawings home. While drawing, they talk. Winnicott asks Iiro if he is happy, and Iiro answers: “One knows if one is sad.”

 

The Conditional Analysis

I have a small remark/complaint about the literature that came up in passing as I was refereeing a paper, not for the first time. I wasn’t sure how to get this out of my craw, so a blog post seemed appropriate.

Various authors, including myself, have inveighed against “the conditional analysis” of ability. Indeed some authors (mainly in the free will literature) taken it as given that this analysis is bankrupt. And yet. In the recent literature, there are several proposals that defend a sophisticated version of the conditional analysis. This recent, elegant, paper in the Philosophical Review is perhaps the best example. So a cursory reading of the literature might suggest that reports of the demise of the conditional analysis were premature.

In fact I think this is not so. There are at least two things that might be called the “conditional analysis”, or, better, there are two roles that conditionals might be thought to play in an account of ability and the ascription of ability. Once we distinguish these, the issues in the literature become much clearer.

First, the conditional analysis might be thought to give a reduction of agentive modality to some more general variety of modality, namely that involved in the subjunctive conditional. So it is proposed that: S is able to A <-> if S were to try to A, S would A. If a reductive semantics of the subjunctive conditional could be given – perhaps in terms of possible worlds a la Stalnaker and Lewis – we would then have gone some way towards the reduction of agentive modality to the amodal. In this sense the conditional analysis of ability is of a piece with the conditional analysis of dispositions, the best-systems account of laws of nature, and other redoubtable members of the Humean repertoire.

I think there’s a pretty good case that this reductive understanding of the conditional analysis is not going to work. (I give a few reasons here and elsewhere). But . . .

Second, the conditional analysis might be deployed to address a quite different issue. This is a problem not of reduction but of extension. Here’s the issue. The things that agents are able to do – what I call their options – are somewhat different from the complements in ability ascriptions. For instance, I might have truly said in 2007: “Obama is able to become President.” But Obama perhaps didn’t have that as an option. Maybe he had a bunch of smaller options – giving this speech, shaking that hand, etc. – that together would add up to his becoming President. And there is some plausibility to understanding that as follows: there was something/somethings Obama could do such that, if he did it/them, he would become President. That is in some sense an “analysis” of “Obama is able to become President,” and it is one that makes essential appeal to a conditional.

Now I’m not sure if that proposal is right, but it’s certainly worth considering as a treatment of the extension problem and it certainly is in some sense a “conditional analysis.” It’s the kind of proposal that’s advanced in the article mentioned above. But it’s important to distinguish it from the traditional conditional analysis. Crucially, a notion of agentive modality figures as a primitive in the account, whereas the whole point of the traditional conditional analysis was to analyze that away. This rather different kind of conditional analysis involves deploying the conditional in a much different, and more modest, way.

So: the conditional analysis, understood as a reductive account of agentive modality, did not work. But, once we admit some primitive agentive modality into our account, we may introduce subjunctive conditionals into our account to solve other problems, such as the extension problem sketched above.

 

 

Email update

I recently have been having some difficulties with my usual email address (john at jmaier.net). In light of that, I’m using my Gmail address as my main address until those issues can be resolved. So please send all emails to: jmaier833 at gmail.com

Relatedly, if you have sent me an email in the last 6-12 months and for some reason I haven’t gotten back to you, it’s possible that I simply never got your email. So try resending it to jmaier833 at gmail.com. Thanks!

Update (May 4, 2020): This issue is now resolved. Please send all emails to: john at jmaier.net. As noted above, if you happened to have not heard back from me at some point in 2019, try resending your email. Thanks!

The Open Seminars

One purpose of this blog is to serve as a home for my various side-projects, one of which (currently on hiatus) is the Open Seminars. Here’s some details about them:

In Summer 2018, I led an online seminar on Wittgenstein’s Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus. The course was free to any student, and consisted of a mix of lecture and live question-and-answer about the Tractatus. In addition to its philosophical content, the course was an experiment in teaching philosophy online in a cost-effective and open way. As such, it may be of interest to others. The entirety of the seminars are available here.

Updates

I’ve made some updates to my website: updating the “About Me” page, adding a link to this blog, and adding abstracts to my publications page. I expect this blog to be the main channel for news about me and my doings in the future.